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Water scarcity is one of the major environmental problems in Southern Europe. High levels of 
water stress and increasing frequency of droughts, along with a greater environmental 
protection, make it necessary to design water management strategies that are allocative efficient 
and balance supply and demand. When functioning markets cannot be developed, the allocation 
rules proposed in the literature of social choice have been recognized as a suitable alternative. 
However, the application of new water allocation rules can be impaired by a lack of acceptance 
and implementation problems. This paper examines these obstacles for the case of an 
agricultural water users association (WUA), situated in the basin of the River Ebro, in relation 
to the governance structure and collective decision rule of the WUA. It analyzes the extent to 
which the gains and losses of the farmers affect their acceptance, and examines conditions for 
building agreements with side payments that provide incentives for the majority of the farmers 
to form part of a possible agreement. The results show that the uniform and sequential rules 
improve the allocative efficiency under normal conditions compared to the status quo and the 
sequential rule even in the case of droughts. In the presence of side payments this rule is likely 
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Highlights:  
• Collective decision making (social choice) and the definition of water allocation 
rules in agriculture. 
• Water allocation rules based on social choice theory improve economic 
allocative efficiency without introducing distributional inequality.  
• The voting system of a water users association often does not support the 
adoption of new water allocation rules.  
• Very small side payments are able to tip the balance towards the adoption of 




































                                                
1. Introduction 
Water scarcity and droughts in Europe, measured in terms of the water exploitation 
index (WEI)1, are an increasing phenomenon that affects at least 11% of the population 
and 17% of the territory (European Commission, 2010). Water resources in Cyprus, 
Bulgaria, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Malta are exposed to constant water stress as these 
countries are currently using up 20% or more of their long-term supplies every year 
(WEI > 20%).  
In Spain, for instance, the demand for water for irrigation purposes is about 15,000 
Hm3 per year and represents about 80% of the total national consumptive demand. 
Water scarcity is extreme in river basins such as the Segura, Júcar, Sur, and the upper 
Guadiana River (INE, 2016).  
Water scarcity and droughts are expected to increase in the near future as a 
consequence of the concurrence of a variety of factors (European Commission, 2015). 
On one hand, the consumptive use of water is likely to increase as a result of the 
expansion of irrigated land, the intensification of tourism and higher transpiration ratios 
of crops due to climate change. On the other hand, the amount of available water is 
likely to decrease in the wake of a decrease in precipitations as well as a change of 
seasonal and geographical patterns.  
The increasing level of water stress along with a more demanding regulation of the 
groundwater and surface water bodies at a European level (Water Framework Directive, 
2000/60/EC), motivated and obliged the member states of the European Union to 
promote water management practices that allow a “good status” of all surface water, 
groundwater and coastal waters in terms of quality and quantity to be accomplished 
(Albiac et al., 2007).  
Numerous studies have assessed the potential of water markets, or of administrative 
water pricing where private and social costs are considered. Both approaches aim at 
balancing the supply and demand of water and sustaining the efficient use of water, i.e., 
allocating water such that it provides the highest social welfare. Traditionally, the 
establishment of markets has been considered as a measure that allows the allocating of 
water among users in a decentralized manner and attenuates the effects of water 
scarcity. Similarly, administrative water pricing allows a reduction in the demand of 
 
1 The water exploitation index (WEI) indicates the amount of water abstracted each year as a proportion 
of total long-term freshwater resources. It is an indicator of the pressure or stress on freshwater resources. 
A WEI above 20% implies that a water resource is under stress, and values above 40% indicate severe 



































water but there is no guarantee that the chosen price maximizes social welfare. 
Administrative water pricing is based on the costs and as such it takes only the supply 
side into account. In contrast, the demand side that is driven by the marginal utility of 
the consumers is not considered and therefore, the maximal social welfare cannot be 
realized. However, the existing economic literature shows that water markets offer the 
most efficient allocation of water and maximize social welfare (Howe et al., 1986; 
Easter and Hearne, 1995; Lee and Jouravlev, 1998).   
The experience with water markets is, however, far from the theoretical ideal. In 
some cases, for example in the Murray-Darling basin in Australia (Bjornlund, 2003), the 
introduction of water markets even worsened the efficiency of water allocation. The 
reasons behind the failure of water markets are complex. It may be caused by the 
existence of political, institutional and/or physical barriers, which prevent vivid 
exchanges between sectors (Carey et al., 2002). Similarly, high transaction costs may be 
behind the difficulties in developing local water markets (Easter et al., 1998). Moreover, 
bureaucratic and legal problems, such as poorly defined water rights, may also prevent 
the functioning of water markets (Calatrava and Garrido, 2005). If functioning markets 
cannot be introduced or developed, allocation rules proposed in the literature of social 
choice may be a good alternative (Barberà, 2005). Goetz et al. (2005, 2008) analyzed 
the application of various allocation rules with Spanish data and concluded that their 
application could lead to significant water savings and improvements in the allocation 
efficiency.  
A recent study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, 2015) states that, besides water availability, governance is a crucial issue for 
the management of water resources. According to the OECD (2015) poorly delineated 
multi-level governance structures and decision processes lead to an unclear allocation of 
roles and responsibilities. Consequently, improvements in water governance present a 
key challenge for better water management.  
By the same token, the adoption of the above-mentioned allocation rules might not 
take place due to problems that are related to the process of collective decision making 
and water governance structures. Accordingly, this paper examines the conditions under 
which these allocation rules improve the allocation efficiency and are likely to be 
adopted by the members of an agricultural water users association. For this purpose, the 
study determines the number of gainers and losers and their associated gains and losses 




































losses of the different farmers affect the outcome of the collective decision process to 
adopt or not a new water allocation rule. Based on the literature on the formation of 
coalitions (Serrano, 2004; Feldman and Serrano, 2006) we analyze if gainers can build 
agreements with side payments that provide incentives for the majority of the farmers to 
form part of an agreement to adopt a new water allocation rule. An empirical analysis 
based on the water allocation of the Almudevar irrigation district in the Ebro basin 
provides insights into driving factors for the acceptance or rejection of a new water 
allocation rule. Our study aims to contribute to the OECD’s Principles on Water 
Governance which encourage evidence-based assessment of the distributional 
consequences of different water allocation rules (OECD, 2015).  
The results show that water allocation rules exist which, in terms of water 
allocation efficiency, are always superior to the existing water allocation rule. However, 
if there is a moderate or severe drought only one of these rules is superior to the existing 
rule. The analysis of the decision process of the Almudevar irrigation district shows 
further that the established voting process would support the adoption of the most 
efficient water allocation rule provided that a small part of the overall gains is used to 
compensate the losers. Moreover, the adoption of the new water allocation rule does not 
lead to an increase in inequality between farmers. 
 
2. Theory of voting and allocative efficiency 
Collective decision making has been analyzed intensively in the economic literature. 
The results show that if side payments are permitted it is always possible to achieve 
allocative efficiency. It guarantees that the outcome provides the highest social welfare 
which in turn allows the gainers to compensate the losers (side payments) without using 
up all of their gains. Yet, it is an open question to what extent this general result still 
holds if the governance structure and the decision process itself are taken into account. 
The wide diversity of governance structures and rules of decision processes foreclose 
the possibility of obtaining a general answer to the question. Thus, one is left with the 
analysis of specific situations. For the case of water management and the acceptance of 
new allocation rules we concentrate on the most decisive characteristics of the collective 
decision process: the number of votes per person (governance structure) and the voting 
process (rules of the decision process).   
An early finding in the field of cooperative governance and the efficiency of 



































outcomes if several bidders compete (Burkhart and Lee, 2008; Grossman and Hart; 
1980, Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988). In a more recent article, 
Dekel and Wolinsky (2012) confirm this rule, and establish that vote buying may 
improve efficiency provided that votes and shares are traded simultaneously. The 
simultaneous trade of votes and shares guarantees that all voters have the same interests, 
i.e., they form a homogenous group.   
In the context of water management, however, an analogy for shares does not exist. 
Yet, the notion of shares suggests that vote buying would improve efficiency if the party 
who tenders their vote receives additional future benefits from the adopted policy by the 
party who won the voting. In fact, this situation may arise when the available water is 
managed by a general assembly of the farmers. The general assembly may establish 
rules which control future access to the resource. Each specific rule that defines future 
water allocation presents future benefits that accrue to the individual members of the 
Water Users Association (WUA). In consequence the land values of the farmers are 
likely to increase or decrease depending on the allocated water rights. In this respect 
land values can be viewed as shares influenced by water allocation rules and the net 
benefits that accrue from the use of the water can be considered as profits that the 
shareholder is entitled to. Hence, decisions of the general assembly that distribute a 
given amount of water in one way or another (water allocation rule) can be viewed as an 
exchange of shares. Based on the analogy between shares and land values we analyze to 
what extent vote buying would improve efficiency in the context of water management, 
taking into account the voting rule and the number of votes per farmer.  
With respect to the number of votes per person Dekel and Wolinsky (2012) assume 
that all shares have identical voting rights. While this assumption is mostly correct in 
the field of cooperative government, it is not in the field of water management. Our 
analysis considers the fact that the number of votes per person is frequently linked to the 
number of hectares owned by the farmer. This peculiarity of many WUAs is not only 
important for the voting process, but also for the determination of side payments. 
Moreover, and in contrast to the study by Dekel and Wolinksy (2012), we consider not 
only a decision rule based on the simple majority, but also on the qualified majority. 
Vote buying may be considered as immoral or politically incorrect; yet, in reality, it 
is a widespread practice. Of course, it does not often occur in the form of monetary 




































possible to include clauses, exceptions, and criteria etc. that favor or harm certain 
groups of agents so that it conditions the farmer’s vote. 
 
3. Materials and Methods 
The previous theoretical results will be tested empirically by using real data from a 
Spanish irrigation district, whose main characteristics are described in this section. The 
data collected will be incorporated into a farm economic model to evaluate the effects of 
different water allocation rules and to determine the farmers’ responses.  
3.1. Area of study 
The area of our numerical application is located in the mid-Ebro Valley; 18 km of 
Huesca in Aragón (Spain) (see Fig. 1). The climate of the zone is Mediterranean, with 










Fig. 1. Map of the location of the study area 
 
The Almudevar irrigation district is representative of one of the numerous 
traditional irrigation districts in the country. The Almudevar WUA is located in the 
province of Huesca, in the northeast of Spain. The total district area covers 3825 ha, 
with 3674 ha of irrigated land.   
The WUA was developed for irrigation in the 1950s, and was designed to apply 
supplementary irrigation to winter cereal crops. Water demand in the area has increased 
since the 1970s due to changes in cropping patterns. In 2008, the modernization process 
of the district began by changing from surface to sprinkler irrigation. Traditionally, the 
most important crops have been winter cereals of wheat and barley (58.8%), corn 
(19.4%) and alfalfa (20.6%), followed by others such as sunflower, rice, fruit and 






























WUA (2008-2009), the crop pattern had become more intensive, growing 
predominantly summer crops (Barros et al., 2011a). Since modernization (2011), corn 
has become the dominant crop (22% as a single crop and 29% as a second crop) 
followed by alfalfa (22%) and winter cereals (17%).  
Over the last 30 years the Almudevar WUA has been studied intensively by 
researchers of the Department of Soils and Irrigation of the Agrifood Research and 
Technology Centre of Aragon (CITA). For example, a representative sample of farmers 
was surveyed in person during the years 2001 to 2015. Although the WUA has 615 
members, only about 71 of them cultivate their own land and the rest of WUA members 
rent their land to these 71 farmers. Therefore, the cropping and managing decisions are 
in the hands of the farmers who cultivate their own land.  
The CITA provided us access to data that they collected via farm surveys during the 
years 2001 to 2015. Specifically, the information about tillage techniques, the amount of 
water and inputs used by farmer and also the cultivated crop were obtained from these 
surveys. This agronomic data set was verified and validated on a number of occasions. 
The data set was employed for numerous publications, for instance by Barros et al. 
2011a, 2011b; Faci et al. 2000; Lecina et al. 2010; Jiménez-Aguirre and Isidoro 2012, 
Jiménez-Aguirre et al. 2014. 
The agronomic data set was used to define the characteristics of the 71 farmers 
considered and to calculate their benefit functions in order to evaluate the efficiency of 
the social rules and the possibility of adopting a new rule according to the outcome of 
the collective decision process (voting). For the purpose of our empirical application, 
we have selected the data of the main crops in the area: the winter cereals wheat and 
barley (irrigated and non-irrigated), corn, pea, alfalfa and sunflower. These selected 
crops covered 2348.5 ha in 2014 (62% of the total cultivated area). Table 1 shows the 
distribution of the main crops covered by the surveys. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of main crops 
Crop Acreage (ha) 
Irrigated winter cereal 206.7 








































1TH_Corn corresponds to two harvests per year: cereal/others after corn 
2TH_Sunflower corresponds to two harvests per year: cereal after sunflower 
 
Market prices for the crops were collected from the Lonja Agropecuaria del Ebro for 
the period considered (2001-2015). The Lonja del Ebro is an association of buyers and 
sellers whose main purpose is to provide a market platform and to fix and record 
farmgate or market prices of agricultural products within the Ebro Valley. Moreover, for 
our study we employed the statistics for the prices of seeds and fertilizers that are 
published by the regional statistical service (Instituto Aragonés de Estadística, 2001-
2015). 
 
3.2. Description of the Almudevar Users’ Association organization 
The key decisions about water management are taken jointly by the two institutions 
operating within the watershed: the watershed regulatory authority (in our case 
Confederación Hidrográfica del Ebro, CHE) and the Almudevar Water Users 
Association. These institutions determine the water allocation for each user, set the 
administrative water price, assign the irrigation turns, and control investment in the 
physical infrastructure and individual water consumption, or its transfer to other users. 
The available water is assigned to each irrigation district in proportion to the size of the 
district. Likewise, the WUA assigns the water to each farmer in proportion to the 
amount of land cultivated by the farmer. Thus, the water is assigned according to the so-
called proportional rule and each farmer is assigned the same amount of water per 
hectare. 
In our case, the statutes of the Almudevar WUA establish the internal operating 
rules of the community. These rules refer to decisions on the distribution of irrigation 
water among shareholders (farmers), decisions on new collective irrigation investments, 
acquisition of additional water (from external users), claims and complaints with respect 
to the irrigation management, economic budgets, etc. In addition, the statutes of the 
WUA establish that any change in water use rights has to be supervised by the Ebro 
watershed regulator (CHE). 
The internal decisions of the WUA are made through the General Assembly (Junta 
General), where all the shareholders make decisions by voting. The Junta General 
adopts resolutions by absolute majority of the voters present. The shareholders may be 
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represented in the Junta General by other shareholders with simple written permission, 










The distribution of the number of votes in the Almudevar WUA is presented in 
Table 2. Any farmer with an amount of land under 1 hectare can associate with others in 
order to accumulate enough land to obtain the corresponding votes. The information 
about the votes will be employed in our empirical illustration of the WUA’s collective 
decision making on the acceptance of new water allocation rules.  
 
Table 2. Distribution of votes in the WUA 
Number of hectares Number of votes 
1 1 
more than 1 to 5 3 
more than 5 to 10 4 
more than 10 to 15 5 
more than 15 to 20 6 
more than 20 to 40 7 
more than 40 to 80 8 








Fig. 2 shows the distribution of votes among the 71 farmers considered in our 
empirical application. Information from surveys indicates that the farmers with less than 
20 hectares accumulate the majority of the votes (211 of 413) with a total extension of 















































3.3. Economic model 
The evaluation of the different rules for assigning water among farmers requires the 
estimation of the net benefit functions of farmers. As a first step we estimated the crop 
production functions for each crop using biophysical data, which were previously 
generated with the biophysical simulator EPIC (Environmental Policy Integrated 
Climate, Mitchell et al., 1998). The EPIC model is able to reproduce the biophysical 
processes in the soil and the process of plant growth as a function of the inputs and the 
weather. The model was calibrated to accurately reflect local conditions with respect to 
climate, soil, and the usual tillage and operational activities and the results were 
validated with the real observed data. As an example of this validation process Table A1 
of the appendix shows the average simulated yields for different crops by EPIC and the 
observed average yields.2 
The crop production functions ŷi, (t/ha) depend on water applied, following the 
polynomial specification: 
2
210ˆ iiiiii wawaay ⋅+⋅+=    (1) 
where wi, (€/m3) denotes the amount of water applied for crop i. In addition, we 
collected data on crop, fertilizer and seeds prices in order to calculate the net benefit 
functions for farmers. As a second step we employed the result of equation (1) for the 
determination of the farmer’s net benefit function. The net benefits of farmer j 
(j=1,…,71), from production activities i=1,…,7 are given by the difference between 
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where pci denotes the market price of crop i (€/tm), parameter ni is the fertilizer cost of 
crop i (€/kg) and si denotes the seed cost for crop i (€/tm). The variable hij denotes the 
 
2 The EPIC model has been used successfully by many researchers throughout the world for local 
(Bontemps and Couture, 1999), regional (Barbier and Bergeron, 2001; Helfand and House, 1995; Mapp et 
al., 1994) and national studies (NOAA, 2000). From our own experience with EPIC (Goetz et al. 2008; 
Martínez and Albiac, 2004, 2006) we can confirm this positive valuation of the biophysical simulation 
model.  
 11
number of hectares cultivated with crop i. The function πj(Ej) determines the total net 
benefits of farmer j given the administrative water price pj and the initial water 








Finally, to estimate the net benefit functions for each farmer we varied the 
parameter wi, between 0 and 11000 m3/ha. From the values obtained for πi(Ei), we 
estimated a new function, denoted by )(ˆ jj Eπ  that relates the j farmer’s net benefit 
obtained from the initial amount of water assigned.  
279 
280 
281 2210ˆ jjjjjj EaEab ⋅+⋅+=π    (3) 
As shown in equation (3), the estimated farm benefit functions )(ˆ jj Eπ  have a 


























These estimated benefit functions were used to evaluate the allocation rules and to 
calculate the economic viability of economic compensations among users for impeding 
or facilitating changes of the allocation rules. Calculations were made using 
Mathematica (Wolfram Research, Inc., 2015). 
For our empirical analysis, we first calculate the efficiency gains obtained by 
introducing two different allocation rules based on social choice theory in comparison 
with the proportional rule, the uniform allocation rule and the sequential allocation rule. 
The uniform rule was proposed initially by Sprumont (1991) and has the properties of 
anonymity, Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness. The last property implies that 
agents cannot increase their allocations by misreporting their preferences, so they have 
no incentives to lie. Barberà et al. (1997) proposed the sequential allocation rule when 
there are asymmetries among the agents that need to be respected. Thus, the sequential 
rule maintains the last two properties but respects asymmetry.  
The preceding social rules were defined and applied for the case of water allocation 
by Goetz et al. (2005, 2008) in the Flumen-Monegros irrigation district. In particular, 
the uniform rule starts with the allocation outcome from applying the proportional rule. 
However, it departs from the proportional allocation if there is a farmer or a group of 
farmers who claim less water than entitled to. In this case, the amount requested is 
allocated and the remaining water is available to be distributed equally among the rest 
of the farmers. This determines a new amount to be distributed proportionally. The 
former procedure is repeated until there are no farmers whose ideal amount of water, 
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i.e., the amount of water that maximizes their net benefits is less than or equal to their 
newly assigned amount. In contrast to the proportional and uniform rules, the initial 
assignments of the sequential rule are not identical but take into account the 
heterogeneity of farmers. In our case, water is distributed according to the farmers’ net 
benefit when there is no scarcity. The appendix provides an example to illustrate the 
operation of the two allocation rules (Tables A.2 and A.3). A more complete exposition 






























                                                
After these intuitive explanations, we will state the specific procedure to evaluate 
each rule. The efficiency gains of any allocation rule are calculated by comparing the 
sum of the farmers’ net benefits resulting from the application of the current 
proportional allocation rule and the newly designed uniform and sequential rules with 
the farmers’ net benefits resulting from the introduction of a water market within the 
same water users association. Thus, we take the outcome of the water market as a 
benchmark for a comparison with respect to the outcomes of the proportional rule, the 
uniform rule and the sequential rule.3  
Once we had calculated each farmer’s gains or losses from changing the current 
proportional rule to a new allocation rule, we examined other aspects that influence its 
acceptance and implementation. Specifically, the identification of gainers and losers 
allows the number of votes and the side payments that are required to have sufficient 
support in the voting process to be calculated. Another relevant aspect is the role of 
transaction costs as an impediment to changing the status quo. Finally, we examine the 
robustness of our results with respect to changes in the climatic conditions. For this 
purpose, we consider the effects of climate change on the allocative efficiency and 
acceptance of the social rules.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
In this section, we analyze the functioning and characteristics of the allocation rules 
established in the previous section. We focus on four key aspects that could affect the 
acceptance and implementation of a new rule in the context of the Almudevar WUA: i) 
 
3 A water market is different from typical good markets because the farmers do not trade the property 
right of the good but rather a temporary user right that was allocated to them. In this respect water 
markets are similar to markets for emission permits. The results of the water market were obtained by 
maximizing the sum of net benefits of all farmers subject to the constraint that farmers cannot sell more 
user rights that they dispose of and the sum of sold water user rights has to be equal to the sum of bought 
rights (market clearance) For more details about the mathematical formulation of this optimization 

























allocative efficiency, ii) the distribution of gains and losses among users and its 
influence on the voting process, iii) the effects of the existence of transaction costs and 
iv) the impact of climate change. 
4.1. Efficiency of the rules 
In a first stage, the allocation rules have been implemented by simulating increasing 
water scarcity situations (from 0% to 50% with respect to the sum of ideal shares of all 
members) in order to evaluate their allocative efficiency. The efficiency losses of rules 
are measured as a percentage of the benefits with respect to the most efficient outcome 
resulting from the introduction of a water market. Fig. 3 reveals that the implementation 
of the sequential rule leads to lower net benefit losses than the proportional and uniform 
rules. The uniform rule is superior to the proportional as long as water reduction is 
inferior to 30%. Thereafter, the net benefit losses are identical to the ones of the 
proportional rule. Hence, the analysis shows that applying the sequential rule in the case 
of droughts provides the opportunity to reduce efficiency losses associated with the 
proportional and uniform rules.  
So far the proposed approach has received little attention in the economic literature 
and it is not really possible to compare our results with findings presented by other 
authors. However, the results are in line with previous finding by Goetz et al. (2008) for 
other irrigation areas (Flumen-Monegros district), where benefit losses reach 12% for 
the proportional rule and 1.5% for the sequential rule in a water scarcity scenario of 
25%. Similarly, Gómez-Limón and Martínez (2006) situate the losses of the 
proportional rule between 12 and 20% for different water scarcity scenarios with respect 















































Fig. 3. Net benefit losses of the rules with respect to outcome of a water market (%) 
 
In a second stage, the rules are implemented and the real water endowments for the 
years 2001 to 2015 were considered. This ex-post analysis allows their effect on 
efficiency to be evaluated under real conditions. The data show that only two of the last 
15 years were especially dry (2009 and 2010), while there was no water scarcity in the 
other years. In the year 2009 severe restrictions were in place, cutting the total amount 
of allocated water by 63% of the water demanded. The subsequent year, 2010, was a 
year of moderate drought, where the available water was equal to 68% of the total 
amount requested.  
Fig. 4 depicts the effect of scarcity on water allocations among users for the 
allocation rules examined. We illustrate the implementation of the rules considering 
three water scarcity scenarios: non-scarcity (regular), moderate scarcity (2010) and 
severe scarcity (2009). In addition, one representative farm has been selected arbitrarily 
from each of the group of low, medium and higher water demand farms. Based on the 
choice of these three farms we analyze how the social rules affect the assigned water 
shares in the case of water scarcity when farmers have different ideal demands. The 
selected farms are numbers 1, 7 and 12, whose ideal demands are 2385, 7914 and 
4682m3/ha respectively. Under the current proportional rule, all farms receive the same 
portion of water. In a regular year, only the farmer’s demand that is below the 
proportional allocation (3252m3/ha) is satisfied. It results in an inefficient allocation, 































































reach 11% and 14% in years of moderate and severe scarcity respectively while the 401 
losses of the sequential rule are 2.6% and 5.4%.  402 
                                                
Fig. 4. Water allocation according to four different mechanisms for three different farms 
based on real water endowments 
 
When no scarcity exists (regular years), the proportional rule is less efficient (8%) 
than the market outcome, while the social rules (uniform and sequential) are as efficient 
as water markets since all farmers obtain their ideal shares. In these periods, total net 
benefits from agriculture sum 1.75 million € when the proportional rule is applied, 4 
while the net benefits would increase to 1.91 million € if either the uniform or 
sequential rule were implemented. The efficiency losses of social rules would be 
insignificant while the application of the proportional rule implied losses of around 8% 
of the benefit. Hence, with no water scarcity, social rules lead to better outcomes than 
the currently applied proportional rule.  
In the case of moderate and severe water scarcities, Fig. 4 illustrates for farms 1, 7 
and 12 that the uniform and proportional rules lead to the same allocations, while the 
sequential rule leads to an allocation that is close to the market outcome. Under 
moderate scarcity, only farm 12 receives its ideal share if the sequential rule is applied. 
However, in the case of severe scarcity all farms are assigned an amount of water that is 
below their ideal share. The efficiency losses of the proportional and uniform rules 
 
4 Monetary values are not presented in graphical form to keep the presentation short. 
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Table 3 presents the total discounted net benefits of the Almudevar WUA over the 
last 15 years for the four different allocation mec
403 





2015), calculated with a discount 409 
rate of 3%  410 
(thousand €) (%) 
5. It demonstrates that the efficiency losses of the uniform rule are much smaller 
than the ones of the proportional rule. It also demonstrates that the efficiency of the 
sequential rule is similar to that of the water market.  
 
Table 3. Discounted net benefits over 15 years (2001-
Allocation rule Discounted net benefits Efficiency losses  
Proportional rule 20772 8.76 
Uniform rule 22431 1.47 
Sequential rule 22659 0.47 
Market 22766 - 
 411 
equential rule s the most interestin or analyzing the 412 






Apart from efficiency, distributional justice is an important factor for acceptance or 419 













Thus, the s become g ule f r
cts among farmers. Thus, the remaining part of the analysis from sections 4.2. to 
4.5. will focus on comparing the sequential rule with the uniform rule, where the latter 
will be considered the status quo situation.  
 
4.2. Distributional effects 
non-acceptance of rules. T
Gini Index (or Gini coefficient), a measure of statistical dispersion initially intended to 
measure inequality between a country’s residents. The Gini Index is the most commonly 
used approach to measure inequality among values of a frequency distribution, where a 
value of 0 indicates equality and a value of 1 perfect inequality. Fig. 5 compares the 
distributional effects of the two rules, for a rising level of water scarcity. Fig. 5a) shows 
the values of the Gini Index with respect to net benefit per hectare while Fig. 5b) shows 
the Gini Index with respect to the total net benefit of the farm. As expected, the 
sequential rule implies an increase in the differences in the net benefit per ha between 
farms since water is assigned to favor the more efficient users (see Fig. 5a). However, 
when the Gini index is calculated with respect to the total net benefits Fig. 5b) shows a 
somewhat counterintuitive result. The application of the sequential rule leads to a lower 




explanation is that, under water scarcity, the sequential rule favors small farms whereas 
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Fig. 5. Distributional effects of the water allocation rules. a) Gini Index with respect to 437 
e net benefit per hectare. b) Gini Index with respect to the total net benefits 438 
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Three voting methods have been explored in order to evaluate how the sequential rule is 441 



















4.3. Voting process and side payments 
accepted by users and how the new rule
The voting processes considered are: “one person-one vote”, “one hectare-one vote”, 
and finally the real voting method established by the statutes of WUA in Almudevar. In 
addition, two alternative majorities will be considered: the simple majority of the votes 
(50% of votes+1) and the qualified majority of two thirds of the votes (66.6% of votes). 
Farmers who obtain higher (or equal) profits under the sequential rule are expected to 
vote for change, otherwise they vote for the status quo (uniform rule). One expects that 
the likelihood of approval depends on the distribution of gains and losses among the 
users of the water association. 
Simulations of water reductions from 0% to 50% as shown in Fig. 6 reflect that the 
sequential rule obtains a decrea
ns that the higher the water scarcity, the more farmers lose with a change. Thus, 
they vote for the status quo. These results indicate that the voting method crucially 
affects the implementation possibilities of the sequential rule. In fact, when water 
scarcity is higher than 15% and a simple majority is required, the sequential rule would 
only be adopted if the “one person-one vote” method were in place. However, if a 






approval of the new rule whatever the voting method applied. Hence, the “one person-
one vote” system favors the change to the sequential rule in the presence of scarcity 
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Fig. 6. Percentage of votes for the adoption of the sequential rule 464 
 465 
 466 
confirm the previous 467 















Results with real water allocations over the last 15 years 
ng method. However, under water scarcity (years 2009 and 2010), the weighting of 
the votes has a strong effect on the probability of approving the sequential rule. In fact, 
only with “one person-one vote” will the sequential rule obtain the simple majority of 
votes in both years (54.9%), while with “one hectare-one vote” and the current voting 
system only 46.4% and 21.5% of users will vote for change (Table 4). The status quo 
will always be maintained in years of water scarcity with qualified majorities whatever 
the voting method. Thus, although the sequential rule improves the total net benefits, 
the degree of water scarcity and the type of majority rule may prevent its adoption due 
to the distribution of gains and losses among farmers. 
Next, we analyzed the voting processes in more detail by examining their effects on 
the required number of votes and side payments for 
idered the case where the change voters (gainers) have the possibility of purchasing 
additional votes from the opposite party. For the payment between users, it is assumed 
that users in favor of the new allocation rule can identify the users with the lowest net 
 19
benefit losses among the farmers that prefer to maintain the current allocation rule. 
Moreover, we assume that the change voters are willing to pay the latter for tendering 
their votes. Table 4 shows the calculations of votes and payments for the specific cases 
of a moderate drought (2010) and a severe drought (2009). The side payments are 
always necessary under the qualified majority rule and payments are lower with “one 
person-one vote” as the number of votes to buy is also lower. After realizing side 
payments among users it is possible to determine that the total net benefits of the new 
rule remain positive. When side payments are permitted, the sequential rule would have 
an opportunity to be implemented for all analyzed voting methods. With a required 
qualified majority, payments would represent 0.005 to 5.98% of total gains in years 
with moderate scarcity and 1.34% to 13.1% in years with severe scarcity. 
 















for change (€) 
































(  (9 ) 
vote QM 71 54.92 9 
22 .72 


























1SM: simple majority; QM: qualified majority;  496 
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he application of the sequential rule. The results are presented in Fig. 7 in the form 
of the Gini Index with respect to total net benefit. When a simple majority is required 
(Fig. 7a), voting processes have no effect on the total benefit distribution among users. 
On the contrary, the requirement of a qualified majority affects distributional justice if 
the scarcity is larger than 10%. In these situations, the real voting method leads to a 
slightly more equalitarian distribution of the net benefits. 
From the analysis of the Gini Index we can affirm that
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ig. 7. Distributional effects of different voting methods: a) Simple majority, b) 511 
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.4. Transaction costs 514 














A determining factor fo
level of transaction costs. If they are sufficiently high, they may annihilate all gains, 
which renders the application of social rules useless. In the context of the water users 
association under study, transaction costs include ex ante costs of drafting and 
negotiating agreements, and the ex post costs associated with verification and 
enforcement of contracts. In this section the effect of transaction costs on private gains 
are assessed by simulating rising levels of these costs from 0 to 2000 € per farmer 
receiving a side payment. Fig. 8 illustrates the benefit gains of change when transaction 






























































































one person‐one vote real one hectare‐one vote  525 
Fig. 8. Gains (%) of the adoption of the sequential rule under different transaction cost 526 
scenarios. a) Simple majority, b) Qualified majority 527 
528 
 methods under the simple majority 529 













mplementation possibilities 543 
o evaluate the robustness of our results with respect to changes in the context we 544 






Fig. 8 a) shows the influence of different voting
ru
” the total net benefits are not affected by transaction costs since the optimal 
farmers’ decision with simple majority is always the sequential rule. Results reveal that 
the net benefits decrease with “real” and “one hectare-one vote” voting methods. With 
respect to the cases of no transaction costs, the gains decrease to 97.1% for the “real” 
voting method and to 94.3% for “one hectare-one vote” method.  
Fig. 8 b) is like Fig. 8 a); however it shows the case of a qualified majority. In this 
situation, the transaction costs reduce total gains for all voting m
case decrease to 87.1% with the “one person-one vote” method, to 82.8% with the 
“real” method and to 88.6% with “one hectare-one vote”. The results show, in general, 
that the introduction of increasing transaction costs, even in the case of severe scarcity, 
does not eliminate the private gains of change.  
 
4.5. Effects of climate change on efficiency and i
T
analyze the allocative efficiency of the social rules in the presence of clim
According to existing climate change scenarios for Spain, temperatures will increase, 
particularly in Southern Spain, and water resources will be severely affected; 
exacerbating droughts. The set of projections by Estrela et al. (2012) considers two 
different scenarios. For the Ebro River basin, where the study area is located, the 
 22
projections for a moderate climate change scenario (B2)5 indicate that available water 
will decrease by 11% and 14% over the time horizons 2041–2070 (medium term) and 
2071–2100 (long term) respectively. Forecasts in the more pessimistic scenario, A2, 
estimate a reduction of water resources by 14% and 28% in the medium term and long 
term respectively. We use these two scenarios in order to analyze the effects of climate 
change on the efficiency and the probability of acceptance. It is assumed that the rest of 
the parameters and variables different from the available water remain constant, i.e., 
prices, costs, number of hectares, number of farmers and the employed technology do 




















Table 5. Discounted aggregate net benefits over 15 years when climate change is 569 
570 
6 
The similarity of th
the little differentiability between results of medium-term B2 and long-term B2 
suggests concentrating on the medium- and long-term results of A2 (14% and 28%). 
Table 5 illustrates that the frequency of droughts will increase by 50% (from 2 to 3 
every 15-year period) in the medium term and by 200% (from 2 to 6) by the end of the 
XXI century. As a consequence, climate change increases the number of periods where 
the sequential rule should be adopted. The discounted net benefits of the WUA for all 
water allocation rules will decrease and the sequential rule continues to be superior to 
the other rules.   
 
considered 
Projections with Frequency of Allocation rule 
Discounted net Efficiency 
Proportional rule 8.72 
climate change droughts benefits (thousand €) losses (%) 
20694 
Uniform rule 22350 1.41 
Sequential rule 
Medium term Every 5 years 
Long term Every 2.5 years nal rule 7  
22573 0.43 (14%) 
Market 22670 - 
Proportio 20553 .07
                                                 
5 The emission scenarios (B2 and A2) are part of the set of scenarios of emission of greenhouse gases 
used in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007).  
6 In the case that some of these parameters change, we conjecture that our conclusions remain valid as 
long as the net benefits of the farmers as a function of the available water remain the same. Likewise, the 
conclusions remain valid if the net benefits change but the changes affect all farmers in the same way, 
i.e., the ranking of the farms with respect to net benefits is not altered. In the case that the ranking is 
affected, our results are likely to be enforced if the spread of the ranking is amplified. For the contrary 
case where the spread of the ranking diminishes, the comparative advantage of the new allocation rules is 
also likely to decrease. 
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for change (€) 
e
al ru
s quo often prevails if side payments are not implemented, especially if a qualified 
majority is required for its approval. Therefore, side payments are necessary to obtain a 
sufficient number of votes. The maximal payments can rise in the medium and long 
term by up to 11.82% and 10.53% of the total gains respectively. These magnitudes 
confirm the previously obtained result that even in the case of severe droughts a small 
part of the gains is already sufficient to compensate the losers.     
 
# of years the sequential MaximumProjections Voting 
with 
change 
rule will be payment  
(% over total  
fficiency gains) 
climate 
SM  QM 
method 
1 SM1 QM 
one person- 1771,74 
one vote 
3 1 0 
 (1.36) 
real 1 1 120 1 4557,39 
Medium 
one hectare- 1 1 15402,64 










real 4 3 116,21 4671,92 
Long term 







. Conclusions 583 








Europe and are likely to affect many river basins. Moreover, the situation is expected to 
aggravate in the near future due to climate change. Thus, policy makers are confronted 
with the challenge of designing policies that balance water demand with supply. Water 
markets are often seen as an efficient instrument to this end. However, functioning 
markets can frequently not be established due to legal, physical or social barriers.  As an 
 24
alternative to markets, the economic literature proposed water allocation rules. The 
application of these rules, however, may be impaired by lack of acceptance and 
implementation problems. 



































cative efficiency of the new allocation rules with the current water allocation rule 
and the market outcome. The results show that the sequential rule is superior to the 
uniform rule and both are superior to the current allocation rule. Their efficiency losses 
are relatively small compared to the market outcome. This result holds even more in the 
case of more frequent and severe droughts (climate change). However great the 
superiority of the new rules, the water users association might not adopt them since the 
number of losers might be greater than the number of gainers. The chance of the new 
allocation rules being approved in the water users association general assembly depends 
on the assignment of votes per person and the type of majority required (simple or 
qualified). Our empirical study of the Almudevar water users association located in the 
Ebro river basin shows that the distribution of gains and losses among the farmers often 
impedes the approval of a new rule, mostly independently of the assignment of votes 
per person and the type of majority rule. However, side payments may tip the balance in 
favor of new allocation rules. The calculations show that only a very small part of the 
gains is needed to compensate the losses of the farmers whose votes are necessary for 
the approval of a new allocation rule. Taking transaction costs into account hardly 
affects the acceptance of a new allocation rule. Even high transaction costs are of minor 
magnitude compared to the overall gains of new allocation rules. Overall, the study 
shows that the implementation of new allocation rules would help to balance supply and 
demand in an efficient manner in particular with climate change taking place in the 
future. 
To 
 and more empirical studies are necessary to confirm our results. Another interesting 
option for future research would be the realization of a pilot study where a water users 
association (or at least some of the farmers from a water users association) examines the 
effect of new allocation rules in practice. To provide incentives for farmers to 
participate we suggest that the allocation rules are introduced gradually. For instance, 
the farmers that are willing to take part in the pilot study could enroll only 10% or 20% 
of their irrigated land. In this way they can learn about the organizational issues of the 
rules and its impact on their net benefits. The partial adoption of the new rule facilitates 
 25
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iven in m3/ha.) 645 
ltivated af
harvests (TH) per year that are denoted by TH_Corn and TH_Sunflower in Table 1.  
 
able A.2. Water allocation following the uniform rule T
(It is assumed that all farmers have 1 ha and quantities are g
 Farmers Remaining 
Allocation 1 4 2 3 water 
Ideal share 2385 7914 4682 3313 13008 
Initial guaranteed portion 
 
3252 3252 3252 3252  
10623 Water assigned 1st round 2385  












 5 5   
Water assigned 3rd r  3655 3655   
 26
Final allocations 2385 33 3 3655 3655 1 0 
 646 
Table A.3. Water allocation following the sequential rule 647 
en in m3/ha) 648 (It is assumed that all farmers have 1 ha and quantities are giv
 Farmers Remaining 
Allocation 1 4 2 3 water 
Ideal share 2385 7914 4682 3313 13008 
Initial guaranteed portion 
10623 
3794 5311 1518 
ound 5941 
4243  1698 
ound 
2385 46 2 13008 
39021 3252 4553 1301  
Water assigned 1st round 2385    
Guaranteed portion   
Water assigned 2nd r   4682  
Guaranteed portion   
Water assigned 3rd r  4243  1698  
Final allocations 4243 8 1698 
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